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NOTES
THE DEFINITION OF COMPETITORS UNDER
SECTION 8 OF THE CLAYTON ACT: THE
EMERGENCE OF SUPPLY SIDE COMPETITION
ANALYSIS
In 1914 Congress enacted the Clayton Act' to prohibit practices facilitating
or encouraging the elimination of competition.2 Section 8 of the Clayton Act
1. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976)). Sec-
tion 2 of the Clayton Act prohibits a seller of goods from discriminating in price between two
or more buyers of the same product. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). Section 3 of the Clayton Act
prohibits a seller of goods from requiring a buyer to refrain from dealing with the seller's com-
petitors. Id. § 14. Section 7 of the Clayton Act restricts corporate mergers that might tend to
restrain trade. Id. § 18 (Supp. IV 1980). Section 8 of the Clayton Act restricts the use of interlock-
ing directorates by banks and competing industrial corporations. Id. § 19 (1976); see infra notes
3-9 and accompanying text (discussion of § 8 of the Clayton Act).
2. See S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914), reprinted in 2 E. KINTNER, THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW AND RELATED STATUTES, 1744 (1978) (Clayton
Act's drafters intended to halt development of trusts and other restraints of trade in incipient
stage by supplementing Sherman Antitrust Act); 51 CONG. Rc. 13848 (1914), reprinted in 2 KINT-
NER, supra, at 1800 (statement of Sen. Culberson) (Congress should enact legislation to prohibit
practices beyond scope of Sherman Act but threatening to competition); see also 15 U.S.C. §§
1-7 (1976) (text of Sherman Act). Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 to prevent the in-
creasing concentration of American business into powerful trusts. See 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890),
reprinted in 1 KINTNER, supra, at 117 (statement of Sen. Sherman). Section 1 of the Sherman
Act prevents the concentration of business by prohibiting contracts, combinations, and conspiracies
in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 2 of the Sherman Act prevents the concentra-
tion of business by forbidding monopolization and attempts to monopolize. Id. § 2. Although
Congress designed the Sherman Act to eliminate the most outrageous competitive abuses, the
Sherman Act failed to restrain several questionable trade practices tending to encourage or facilitate
the elimination of competition. See S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914), reprinted
in 2 KINTNER, supra, at 1744 (Sherman Act does not arrest creation of trusts in incipient stage).
Furthermore, in 1911, the Supreme Court substantially weakened the Sherman Act by limiting
the Sherman Act's application to unreasonable restraints of trade. See Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911) (§ 1 of the Sherman Act subject to rule of reason analysis
since every contract results in some restraint of trade); see also Borg-Warner Corp., 3 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) f 22,049, at 22,667 (F.T.C. June 23, 1983) (Congress enacted Clayton Act
partly in response to Supreme Court's adoption of rule of reason approach to Sherman Act);
Mattson, Tying Arrangements-An Update, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 857, 858 (1982) (Congress enacted
Clayton Act in part to fill gaps opened in Sherman Act by Standard Oil decision). By 1914 many
observers in Congress concluded that the language of the Sherman Act was too narrow to combat
effectively the trust problem. See H.R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 1, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914), reprinted
in 2 KINTNER, supra, at 1099 (trend toward concentration continued after enactment of Sherman
Act). The Clayton Act extended the coverage of the antitrust laws to four problems not addressed
by the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) (price discrimination); id. § 14 (tying
arrangements); id. § 18 (Supp. IV 1980) (mergers tending to restrain trade); id. § 19 (1976) (in-
terlocking directorates); see also S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914), reprinted in
2 KINTNER, supra, at 1744 (Sherman Act should be supplemented in at least four areas).
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restricts the use of interlocking directorates by competing corporations because
directoral interlocks between competitors may tend to facilitate anticompetitive
practices.3 An interlock occurs whenever two corporate boards have one or
more common directors.4 Although directoral interlocks are commonplace'
and generally do not threaten competition, 6 a director sitting on the boards
of two competing corporations may substantially reduce competition between
the two corporations by coordinating the two corporations' policies.' Section
3. See H.R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 1, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1914), reprinted in 2 KINT-
NER, supra note 2, at 1099 (interlocking directorates between competing corporations only main-
tain uniform policies among interlocked competing corporations). In reporting on § 8 of the
Clayton Act, the House Committee on the Judiciary not only objected to the tendency of in-
terlocks to facilitate collusion between competing firms, but also objected to the tendency of
interlocks to create conflicts of interest for directors serving on more than one board and on
the tendency of interlocks to discourage the development of new leadership. Id.; see STA-F OF
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89Ti CONG., 1ST Sass., REPORT ON INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE
MANAGEMENT 7 (Comm. Print 1965) (interlocks objectionable because interlocks raise threats
of collusion, create conflicts of interest, and diminish opportunities for young leaders) [hereinafter
cited as COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY].
4. See 5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1300-01, at 359-64 (1978) (general
discussion of interlocks); COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 3, at 10 (same). Generally, in-
terlocks fit into one of two categories, direct or indirect. See 5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
1300, at 359 (interlocks may be direct or indirect). A direct interlock between two corporations
occurs when a single individual serves on the boards of each of two corporations. Id. An indirect
interlock may occur in several ways. See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 3, at 10. For
example, corporation A and corporation B may be indirectly linked if both corporation A and
corporation B share a common director with corporation C. Id. Similarly, corporations A and
B may be indirectly linked if a close friend, relative, or associate of a director of corporation
A serves on the board of directors of corporation B. See 5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
1300, at 359 (discussion of various kinds of indirect interlocks). Although directoral interlocks
may be either direct or indirect, § 8 of the Clayton Act regulates only direct interlocks. See 15
U.S.C. § 19 (1976) (no individual may serve simultaneously on boards of two or more competing
corporations); see also 5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra, 1301(c), at 363 (§ 8 directed
only at direct interlocks); Travers, Interlocks in Corporate Management and the Antitrust Laws,
46 TEx. L. REv. 819, 823 (1968) (§ 8 does not prohibit indirect interlocks).
5. See STAFF OF ACCOUNTING & MANAGEMENT SUBCOMM. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERN-
MENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 2D SSS., INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES AMONG THE MAJOR U.S.
CORPORATIONS 27 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as ACCOUNTING & MANAGEMENT SUB-
COMM.]. A study of 130 major American corporations by the Accounting and Management Sub-
committee indicated that in 1976 the United States' 13 largest corporations had a total of 240
direct interlocks with the boards of other corporations. Id.
6. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 652, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1951) (not all directoral interlocks threaten competition)
[hereinafter cited as FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION]. An individual could serve on the boards of
several corporations engaged in completely unrelated businesses without endangering the com-
petitive process. Cf. infra note 7 (discussion of danger inhering in interlocks between competing
corporations).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 1, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1914), reprinted in 2 KINTNER,
supra note 2, at 1099 (maintenance of uniform policies is principal result of directoral interlocks);
ACCOUNTING & MANAGEMENT SUBCOMM., supra note 5, at 6 (concentration through interlocks
can lead to uniform policy determination throughout industry). Although the most common ob-
jection to directoral interlocks between competitors is that'interlocks between competitors facilitate
collusion, tending to result in uniform policies throughout the industry, commentators have noted
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8 prevents the use of directoral interlocks between competing corporations
by prohibiting an individual from serving on the boards of two or more com-
peting corporations if an agreement eliminating competition between the com-
peting corporations would violate the federal antitrust laws.8 Since section 8
prohibits interlocks only between competing corporations, a crucial issue aris-
ing under section 8 is what standard the courts should apply to determine
whether two corporations compete. 9 Only a few cases,however, have examined
the issue of whether two corporations with interlocking directorates compete" °
several other objections to directoral interlocks between competitors. See 5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 4, 1300, at 359. Professors Areeda and Turner note that interlocks between com-
peting corporations may lead to fiduciary conflicts in which a director of two competing corpora-
tions is tempted to undermine the interests of one of the corporations to further the interests
of the second corporation. Id. Professors Areeda and Turner also note that directoral interlocks
between competing corporations may facilitate agreements between competing corporations to
form illicit joint ventures or to raise barriers to new entry into the industry. Id.
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976). Paragraph four of § 8 of the Clayton Act, sometimes called
the competing corporations paragraph, prohibits an individual from serving simultaneously on
the boards of two corporations other than banks, trust companies, and common carriers if one
of the two corporations has a combined worth exceeding $1,000,000 and if the two corporations
compete "so that" an agreement eliminating competition between the corporations would violate
the federal antitrust laws. Id. Congress established the $1,000,000 size requirement in § 8 because
Congress did not deem interlocks between small industrial corporations a threat to competition.
See H.R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 1, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914), reprinted in 2 KINTNER, supra
note 2, at 1099 (discussion of § 8 size requirement). Several courts have considered the meaning
of the "so that" clause of § 8. See United States v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614,
617 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (Congress included "so that" language in § 8 to avoid unconstitutionally
regulating intrastate commerce); TRW, Inc., 93 F.T.C. 325, 379-80 (1979) ("so that" clause of
§ 8 does not define the term "competitors"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 647 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1981).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976) (individual may not serve on boards of directors of several
competing corporations); Travers, supra note 4, at 823 (section 8 does not prohibit vertical in-
terlocks or interlocks between potentially competitive corporations). Courts have upheld direc-
toral interlocks between noncompeting corporations. See American Bakeries Co. v. Gourmet Bakers,
Inc., 515 F. Supp. 977, 982 (D. Md. 1981) (interlock allowed under § 8 since interlocked bakery
corporations did not compete); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., 1966
TRADE CAs. (CCH) 71,678, at 82,064-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (interlock between entertainment in-
dustry corporations not prohibited under § 8 because corporations not horizontally related).
10. See TRW, Inc. v. FC, 647 F.2d 942, 945-46 (9th Cir. 1981) (interlock between manufac-
turers of credit authorization and electronic funds transfer systems); American Bakeries Co. v.
Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D. Md. 1981) (interlock between bakery com-
panies); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., 1966 TRADE CAS. (CCH)
71,678, at 82,065 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (interlock between entertainment firms); Borg-Warner Corp.,
3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,049, at 22,654, 22,659 (F.T.C. June 23, 1983) (interlock between
firms producing automobile parts). Of the four cases addressing the question of whether two
interlocked corporations competed with one another, only three have sought to apply any workable
test or standard of competition. See TRW, 647 F.2d at 946-47; American Bakeries, 515 F. Supp.
at 980-82; Borg-Warner, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,049, at 22,659-63.
In Paramount, Paramount Pictures, a producer of television programs and motion pictures,
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to remove
two hostile directors, Herbert Siegel and Ernest Martin, from the Paramount board. 1966 TRADE
CAs. (CCH) 71,678, at 82,059-60. Siegel and Martin had accepted the Paramount directorships
in exchange for an agreement to divest themselves of a large block of Paramount stock. Id. Para-
mount charged that Siegel's and Martin's memberships on the Paramount board violated § 8
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and the courts resolving these few cases have applied different standards to
determine whether the interlocked corporations did compete."
The definition of competitors is crucial in section 8 enforcement because
the statute bars interlocks only between competing corporations.' 2 In deciding
whether corporations with interlocking boards compete, courts have sometimes
applied the tests established under the merger provisions of section 7 of the
Clayton Act to define competitive markets.' 3 Under the merger rules of sec-
of the Clayton Act because both Siegel and Martin served on the boards of corporations com-
peting with Paramount. Id. Siegel served as chairman of Baldwin-Montrose Chemical Company,
whose subsidiary, General Artists Corporation (GAC), represented producers of television pro-
grams as a sales agent and Martin served as a director of Feuer & Martin Productions, Inc.
(FMP), a corporation producing stage plays. Id. at 82,061-62. The Paramount court rejected
Paramount's plea for injunctive relief, holding that neither GAC, nor FMP competed with Para-
mount. Id. at 82,065. Although the Paramount court concluded that GAC and FMP were not
competitors of Paramount's, the court did not establish any clear criteria for determining whether
two corporations compete. See id. Instead, the court simply stated as a conclusion of law that
neither GAC, nor FMP, were related horizontally to Paramount. Id.
In United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California stated in dictum that competition under § 8 should be determined by com-
mon sales in the same product and geographic market. 422 F. Supp. 686, 703-04 (N.D. Cal.
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'dsub nom. BankAmerica Corp.
v. United States, -U.S.-., 103 S. Ct. 2266 (1983). The Crocker court, however, did not
consider the issue of how courts should define the relevant product and geographic markets because
the Crocker defendants stipulated to the existence of competition. Id. at 704.
11. See infra notes 43-89 and accompanying text (discussion of cases considering definition
of competition under Clayton Act § 8).
12. See supra note 9 (§ 8 of Clayton Act outlaws interlocks between industrial and com-
mercial corporations only when corporations compete). The coverage of § 8 of the Clayton Act
is very narrow, outlawing interlocks only between competing corporations and, under certain
circumstances, between banks. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976). Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, however, may provide an alternative basis for attacking directoral interlocks that
§ 8 of the Clayton Act does not prohibit. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976) (unfair methods of
competition are illegal). The FTC, on several occasions, has held that directoral interlocks violating
§ 8 of the Clayton Act also violated § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See Borg-
Warner Corp., 3 TADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,049, at 22,654, 22,668 (F.T.C. June 23, 1983)
(violation of § 8 is in itself violation of § 5); TRW, Inc., 93 F.T.C. 325, 386 n.22 (1979) (defen-
dants' violation of § 8 constituted violation of § 5), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 647 F.2d 942
(9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit and the FTC, however, expressly have declined comment on
the issue of whether § 5 may prohibit interlocks not prohibited by § 8. See TRW, hIc. v. FTC,
647 F.2d 942, 945 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) (no need to consider whether § 5 affords broader coverage
because defendants violated § 8); Borg-Warner Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,049, at
22,668-69 (issue of whether § 5 coverage extends to interlocks not prohibited under § 8 not reached);
TRW, 93 F.T.C. at 386 n.22 (no need to consider whether § 5 coverage broader than § 8 because
§ 8 violated). But see Halverson, Should Interlocking Director Relationships Be Subject to Regulation
and, if so, What kind?, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 349 (1976) (0 5 may prohibit interlocks not
prohibited by § 8).
13. See American Bakeries Co. v. Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 977, 981 (D. Md.
1981) (competition under § 8 determined by cross-elasticity of demand test and reasonable inter-
changeability of use test); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)
(boundaries of relevant product market for § 7 analysis determined by cross-elasticity of demand
test and reasonable interchangeability of use test); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. IV 1980) (Clayton Act
§ 7). Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits certain acquisitions of corporate stock and assets
[Vol. 41:135
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tion 7, courts generally have determined whether two corporations compete
by applying a cross-elasticity of demand test or a reasonable interchangeability
of use tests.' 4 Cross-elasticity of demand is an economic measure of the sen-
sitivity of consumer demand for one product to fluctuations in the price of
a second product.' 5 Two products have cross-elastic demand whenever demand
for one product rises as the price of a second product rises, and falls as the
price of a second product falls. 6 For example, when two products, widgets
and gidgets, compete closely, consumer demand for either product can be
by both individuals and corporations. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. IV 1980). Paragraph one of § 7
prohibits persons engaged in commerce from acquiring all or part of the stock, share capital,
or assets of another person engaged in commerce if the effect of the acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition or to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. Id. Paragraph
two of § 7 prohibits persons not engaged in commerce from acquiring the stock, share capital,
or assets of a person engaged in commerce if the effect of the acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition or to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. Id. In considering the
validity of a merger challenged under § 7, a court must first define the market in which competi-
tion may be lessened. See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593
(1957) (market definition is necessary predicate to finding violation of § 7). In defining the rele-
vant market for § 7 analysis, the courts generally have applied two threshold tests, cross-elasticity
of demand and reasonable interchangeability of use. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 (cross-
elasticity of demand and reasonable interchangeability of use are proper standards for defining
market under § 7). The Brown Shoe Court, however, recognized that other factors also may
be helpful in determining the boundaries of the relevant market. Id.; see infra notes 29-37 and
accompanying text (discussion of relevant submarkets).
14. See supra note 13 (cross-elasticity of demand test and reasonable interchangeability of
use test are threshold tests in § 7 analysis).
15. See TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942, 947 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981) (cross-elasticity of de-
mand defined); see also United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400
(1956). In DuPont, a landmark case on market definition, the Justice Department charged that
DuPont had violated § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by monopolizing the cellophane market.
Id. at 378. Although DuPont produced 7507o of all cellophane sold in the United States, DuPont
contended that the relevant market in which to measure DuPont's power was the flexible wrapp-
ing materials market. Id. at 379-80. DuPont's cellophane sales totalled less than 20% of the flexi-
ble wrapping materials market. Id. The DuPont Court accepted DuPont's proposed market defini-
tion because the Court found a high cross-elasticity of demand between the various flexible wrap-
ping materials. Id. at 400. The DuPont Court cited evidence in the record indicating that increase
in the price of cellophane caused many of DuPont's customers to begin using glassine, waxed
paper, and other flexible wrapping materials in place of cellophane. Id. Likewise, the Court noted
that as cellophane prices fell, customers who had been using glassine and waxed paper began
to use cellophane instead. Id.
Commentators have criticized the DuPont decision because the Court failed to apply pro-
perly the cross-elasticity of demand test. See Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case,
70 HARv. L. REV. 281, 308-09 (1956). Professor Turner argues that the DuPont Court improperly
measured cross-elasticity of demand at prevailing prices. Id. Turner states that the correct ap-
proach would require the Court to consider as competing products only products that would
be substitutes at or near competitive price levels. Id.; see also R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN
EcoNowIc PERSPECTIVE 128 (1976) (even poor substitutes become attractive if price of principal
product rises high enough). Professor Turner notes, however, that cross-elasticity of demand
may be a sound economic measure of competition when properly applied to discover substitutes
at competitive price levels. Turner, supra, at 309.
16. See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956) (glassine
demand rose and fell in response to cellophane price changes).
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satisfied by the other product. 7 Either a sharp rise in the price of widgets
or a sharp decline in the price of gidgets may cause consumers to substitute
gidgets for widgets.' 8 A high cross-elasticity of demand between two products,
therefore, suggests competition between those products.' 9 Conversely, a low
or negative cross-elasticity of demand suggests the absence of competition. "
Since cross-elasticity of demand is difficult to measure in practice, courts
often apply the reasonable interchangeability of use test as a proxy for de-
mand cross-elasticity.' When consumers can use two products interchangeably,
the consumers' demand for either product generally will be affected by
fluctuations in the price of the second product.2" Products that are reasonably
interchangeable, therefore, will generally have cross-elastic demand.23 Unlike
the cross-elasticity of demand test's focus on consumer perceptions, the
reasonable interchangeability of use standard focuses on the physical and func-
tional characteristics of the products.2 " Under the reasonable interchangeability
of use test, a court examines whether two products perform essentially the
same tasks and whether the two products are physically alike. 2s Either physical
or functional similarity between two products may suggest competition be-
tween the two products.2 '
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See American Bakeries Co. v. Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 977, 981 (D. Md.
1981) (high cross-elasticity of demand would prove competition).
20. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF TaE LAW OF ANTITRUST 54 (1977) (unrelated or non-
competing products would reflect zero or negative cross-elasticity of demand).
21. See American Bakeries Co. v. Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 977, 981 (D. Md.
1981) (reasonable interchangeability of use is alternative inquiry to cross-elasticity for finding
competition under § 8); See also R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 125-26. Judge Posner notes that,
although cross-elasticity of demand is the best indication of competition, courts often must resort
to more general market definition standards because cross-elasticity of demand is difficult to
measure with confidence. Id.; see also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 58 (in some cases evidence
of cross-elasticity of demand may be too costly to acquire).
22. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 58 (interchangeability of use is indirect indicator
of market definition).
23. See American Bakeries Co. v. Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 977, 981 (D. Md.
1981) (interchangeability of use test and cross-elasticity of demand test pose same question from
different angles); see also 16B J. VoN KALiNOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION
§ 13.0312], at 13-38 (1983) (although aim of cross-elasticity of demand test and reasonable inter-
changeability of use test is same, tests have different focuses).
24. See American Bakeries Co. v. Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 977, 981 (D. Md.
1981) (cross-elasticity of demand test focuses on consumer perception while interchangeability
of use test focuses on product capabilities); see also 16B J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 23,
§ 13.03[2], at 13-39 (cross-elasticity of demand test and interchangeability of use test focus on
different factors).
25. See American Bakeries Co. v. Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 977, 981 (D. Md.
1981) (two elements of reasonable interchangeability of use are similarity of use and physical
similarity); see also 16B J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 23, § 13.0312], at 13-39 to 13-40 (similarity
of use and physical similarity are elements of reasonable interchangeability).
26. See American Bakeries v. Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 977, 981 (D. Md. 1981)
(showing of either physical similarity or similarity of use will satisfy § 8 competition requirement).
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In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,27 the Supreme Court established cross-
elasticity of demand and reasonable interchangeability of use as the proper
tests of competition under section 7 of the Clayton Act.2" The Brown Shoe
Court, however, noted that a broadly defined product market may contain
relevant submarkets within which competition is especially intense. 29 The Brown
Shoe Court listed seven "practical indicia" that tend to indicate whether two
products occupy different submarkets within an overall product market .3 The
seven "practical indicia" listed in Brown Shoe include whether the industry
and the public perceive distinct submarkets within the broadly defined pro-
duct market, 3' whether one of the two products enjoys peculiar character-
istics and uses, 3 2 whether the two producers use distinct production
27. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). In Brown Shoe, the Justice Department charged that the merger
of Brown Shoe Company, the nation's third largest seller of shoes, with the G. R. Kinney Com-
pany, the industry's eighth largest seller, violated § 7 of the Clayton Act by substantially lessen-
ing competition in the manufacture and sale of men's, women's, and children's shoes. Id. at
296-97. Brown Shoe contended that the Government incorrectly characterized the relevant lines
of commerce as men's shoes, women's shoes, and children's shoes. Id. at 298. Brown Shoe argued
that the relevant markets for analyzing the merger's anticompetitive effects should have been
more narrowly drawn to account for price/quality and age/sex distinctions. Id. at 326-27. For
example, Brown Shoe contended that little boys' shoes did not compete with little girls' shoes
and that infants' shoes did not compete with either little boys' shoes or little girls' shoes. Id.
at 327. Similarly, Brown Shoe argued that discount shoes did not compete with either high priced
shoes or medium priced shoes. Id at 326. Brown Shoe urged that if the relevant lines of commerce
had been defined more narrowly, the evidence would have shown no danger of a lessening of
competition in any line of commerce. Id. at 298. The district court accepted the Government's
proposed market definition and further held that the merger between Brown Shoe and Kinney
had lessened competition substantially in the manufacture and sale of men's shoes, women's shoes,
and children's shoes. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 741 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's findings with respect to both market
definition and lessening of competition. 370 U.S. at 340, 346.
28. See 370 U.S. at 325 (product market's outer boundaries determined by cross-elasticity
of demand or by reasonable interchangeability of use).
29. See id. (submarkets may in and of themselves constitute relevant markets for antitrust
purposes).
30. Id.
31. 370 U.S. at 325; see 16B J. VoN KAL N owsKI, supra note 23, § 18.02[2][b], at 18-63
to 18-66. An industry or public perception that two products do not compete may be evidence
that the two products occupy distinct submarkets. See 16B J. VoN KAINOWSKI, supra note 23,
§ 18.0212][b], at 18-63. An industry perception that two products do not compete may keep pro-
ducers from marketing the first product to consumers of the second product.See Reynolds Metals
Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 225, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (florist foil a distinct submarket because
manufacturers of other foils did not produce decorative florist foil and producers of other decorative
foils did not sell to florists). Likewise, a public perception that two products are distinct may
prevent consumers from accepting viable substitutes. See Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 1981-2
TRADE CAs. (CCH) 64,330, at 74,512 (E.D.N.Y.) (United States Navy's unwillingness to buy
carrier based aircraft from inexperienced manufacturers made experienced manufacturers' carrier
based aircraft distinct submarket), aff'd, 1981-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 64,364, at 74,683 (2d Cir.
1981).
32. 370 U.S. at 325; see 16B J. VoN KALINOWSKI, supra note 23, § 18.0212][c], at 18-66
to 18-70. Within a broad product market, some products may possess unique characteristics making
these unique products part of a distinct submarket as well as part of a broader market. See United
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methods, 33 whether the two producers use distinct distribution channels, 3' whether
the two producers serve different customers, 35 whether the two products sell at
different prices, 36 and whether the two producers respond to changes in each
others pricing policies.3 7 Although the Brown Shoe Court ultimately considered
a number of factors, the Court's opinion clearly established cross-elasticity
of demand and reasonable interchangeability of use as the threshold competi-
tion inquiries in defining the relevant market under section 7.38 Under section
8 of the Clayton Act, however, the standard for determining whether two
corporations compete is not so clear.
39
States v. American Technical Indus., Inc., 1974-1 TRADE CAs. (CCH) 74,873, at 95,873 (M.D.
Pa. 1974) (although real and artificial Christmas trees perform same function and belong to same
product market, artificial trees constitute revelvant submarket offering additional advantages of
fire resistance and long life).
33. 370 U.S. at 325; see 16B J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 23, § 18.0212][f], at 18-80
to 18-81. Uniqueness of production facilities required for manufacturing a given product may
indicate that the product is in a distinct submarket. See United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
264 F. Supp. 439, 454 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (sanitary paper products constituted relevant submarket
within broader paper products market because production of sanitary paper products required
special machinery). In Kimberly-Clark, the court narrowed the relevant market because the defendants
proved that the facilities used in producing sanitary paper products were dissimilar to the facilities
used in the broader paper products market. Id. A somewhat analogous proposition is that firms
with similar production facilities may belong to the same market notwithstanding that the pro-
ducts produced by the firms are dissimilar. See 370 U.S. at 325 n.42 (cross-elasticity of supply
may indicate that products belong to a single market); see also infra notes 94-96, 109-15 and
accompanying text (discussion of supply cross-elasticity's role in market definition).
34. 370 U.S. at 325; see 16B J. VON KALINOwsKI, supra note 23, § 18.0212][g], at 18-81
to 18-82. The existence of specialized vendors for a product may be evidence that the product
belongs to a distinct submarket. See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp.
729, 740 (D. Md. 1976) (professional chainsaws constituted relevant submarket because occa-
sional users rarely purchased saws from logging equipment distributors and professional loggers
rarely purchased saws from hardware or department stores).
35. 370 U.S. at 325; see 16B J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 23, § 18.02[2][d], at 18-70
to 18-72. Products with distinct classes of customers may be in distinct submarkets. See United
States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 739 (D. Md. 1976) (lightweight, inexpen-
sive chainsaws constituted distinct submarket because occasional users used only these saws, while
professional loggers used only more expensive, high powered saws).
36. 370 U.S. at 325; see 16B J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 23, § 18.0212][e], at 18-73
to 18-79. Market price differences between two otherwise reasonably interchangeable products
may be evidence that the two products occupy separate submarkets. See United States v. Black
& Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 739 (D. Md. 1976) (chainsaws priced under $200 con-
stituted relevant submarket because occasional users generally purchased only inexpensive saws).
37. 370 U.S. at 325; see 16B J. VON KALINOWSII, supra note 23, § 18.02[2][e], at 18-73
to 18-81. Proof that the price of a product is unresponsive to fluctuations in the prices of alleged
substitutes may be evidence that the product occupies a distinct submarket within the broader
product market. See United States v. American Technical Indus., Inc., 1974-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH)
74,873 at 95,873 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (artificial christmas trees constitute distinct submarket because
manufactures of artificial trees set prices without regard to prevailing natural tree prices).
38. See 370 U.S. at 325 (outer boundaries of product market determined by cross-elasticity
of demand or reasonable interchangeability of use).
39. See infra notes 43-89 and accompanying text (discussion of cases considering definition
of competition under Clayton Act § 8).
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Litigation under section 8 of the Clayton Act is infrequent 40 and, in most
reported cases brought under the statute, defendants have stipulated
competition.' Few courts, therefore, have confronted the issue of whether
two corporations with interlocking directorates were competitors.4" The first
case to address whether two corporations with interlocking directorates were
competitors was American Bakeries Co. v. Gourmet Bakers, Inc." In American
Bakeries, a manufacturer and wholesaler of baked goods, American Bakeries,
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland to
enjoin Gourmet Bakers from electing Peter Grimm, a director of Gourmet,
to American's board of directors." Gourmet, a warehouser and distributor
of bakery ingredients, was engaged in a proxy contest to win control of
American and sought to elect Grimm to the American board as part of a
takeover plan." American contended that section 8 of the Clayton Act pro-
hibited Grimm's simultaneous service on the Gourmet and American boards
of directors because Gourmet and American competed in sales of baked goods
to grocery stores and to fast food restaurant chains.1
6
The American Bakeries court examined whether Gourmet and American
were competitors by applying the reasonable interchangeability of use test
established in Brown Shoe to define markets under section 7 of the Clayton
Act. 7 The court examined the two corporations' sales to grocery stores and
noted that the raw ingredients Gourmet sold to grocery stores were not inter-
changeable with the fresh baked goods American sold to grocery stores. 8 Fur-
40. See J. Wilson, Unlocking Interlocks: The On-Again Off-Again Saga of Section 8 of
the Clayton Act, 45 ANTrrRUST L.J. 317, 317 n.1 (1976). From 1914 to 1950, government and
private plaintiffs filed seven § 8 complaints challenging thirteen interlocks. Id. Of these com-
plaints, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed five upon the resignations of the suspect directors,
one complaint resulted in a consent order, and only one complaint went to litigation. Id. From
1950 to 1976 plaintiffs filed thirty-four complaints challenging forty-five interlocks. Id. Of the
latter complaints, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed seven suits upon the directors' resignations,
and eleven complaints went to litigation. Id.; see Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585,
586-87 (7th Cir. 1973) (Seventh Circuit never considered § 8 case until 1973).
41. See, e.g., BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, ____U.S._, 103 S. Ct. 2266, 2268
(1983) (competition between interlocked banks and insurance companies stipulated); Protectoseal
Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1973) (defendant admitted $1,500,000 competitive
overlap in faucets, fittings, and tanks for flammable liquids); United States v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (defendants admitted competition in seven pro-
duct categories in ninety-seven communities); see also TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942, 946
(9th Cir. 1981) (competition stipulated in prior cases).
42. See supra note 10 (discussion of cases considering competition issue).
43. 515 F. Supp. 977 (D. Md. 1981).
44. Id. at 977-79.
45. Id. at 979.
46. Id. at 980-81. The American Bakeries court found that both American and Gourmet
sold bakery products to Pathmark supermarkets and to fast food restaurants in the New York
metropolitan area. Id. at 980.
47. See supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text (discussion of cross-elasticity of demand
and reasonable interchangeability of use tests of competition).
48. 515 F. Supp. at 980-81. The American Bakeries court noted that the ultimate configuration
of the bakery materials Gourmet sold to grocery stores was determined by the grocer's process-
ing, while the retail form of the American products was fixed upon delivery. Id. at 981.
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thermore, the American Bakeries court found that the products Gourmet and
American sold to fast food restaurant chains were not interchangeable because
American sold only fresh baked steak rolls to restaurant chains whereas
Gourmet sold only frozen rolls to restaurant chains. "9 The court denied
American's request for injunctive relief concluding that the absence of inter-
changeability between the uses of American's and Gourmet's products indicated
that American and Gourmet were not competitors."0
Although the American Bakeries decision appeared to signal the courts'
acceptance of the Brown Shoe cross-elasticity of demand and reasonable in-
terchangeability of use standards as appropriate tests for defining competi-
tion under section 8 of the Clayton Act,5 the Ninth Circuit's opinion in TRW,
Inc. v. FTC2 effectively challenged the applicability of the cross-elasticity of
demand and interchangeability of use standards to section 8 cases. 3 In TRW,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) staff charged TRW, Addressograph-
Multigraph Corporation (A-M), and Horace Shepard with violating section
8 of the Clayton Act during a four and one-half year period in which Shepard
served on the boards of both TRW and A-M." Both TRW and A-M manufac-
tured and sold point-of-sale credit authorization systems and electronic funds
transfer machines. 5 The defendants, however, contended that TRW and A-
M did not compete because customers could not use the TRW and A-M systems
interchangeably."1
49. Id. at 981-82. Although the American Bakeries court found that American Bakeries
and Gourmet Bakers sold different products to restaurant chains, the court also held that of
the two corporations, only American had the power to determine product prices and specifica-
tions. Id. at 982. The court noted that American negotiated independently with the restaurant
chains to manufacture and supply steak rolls to the restaurants and that Gourmet merely received,
stored, and shipped rolls that the restaurant chains bought from other baked goods manufac-
tures. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 980 (despite paucity of § 8 case law, clear guidelines indicate interchange-
ability of use should determine whether interlocked corporations compete).
52. 647 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1981).
53. Id. at 947; see infra notes 73-75 (cross-elasticity of demand test and reasonable inter-
changeability of use test are not always appropriate in Clayton Act § 8 cases).
54. 647 F.2d at 945. The terms of the Clayton Act provide for concurrent enforcement
of § 8 by a variety of plaintiffs. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 21, 25-26 (1976). Section 11 of the Clayton
Act grants the Federal Trade Commission authority to enforce § 8. Id. § 21. Section 15 of the
Clayton Act authorizes actions by the United States Attorney General to prevent and restrain
violations of § 8. Id. § 25. Section 16 of the Clayton Act authorizes private suits for injunctive
relief under § 8. Id. § 26. The Clayton Act also grants limited § 8 enforcement authority to
the Federal Reserve Board. Id. § 21. The Federal Reserve Board's authority, however, does not
extend to the competing corporations paragraph of § 8 of the Clayton Act. Id. § 21.
55. 647 F.2d at 947-48.
56. Id. at 947. In the initial TRW decision, the administrative law judge noted significant
distinctions between the TRW and the A-M systems. TRW, Inc., 93 F.T.C. 325, 335-59 (1979)
(F.T.C. review incorporating initial decision of administrative law judge), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 647 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1981). The administrative law judge found that the TRW system
4000 and the TRW system 5000, the principal TRW products at issue, best accommodated large
department stores and banks with heavy transactional traffic originating from numerous terminals.
Id. at 335. Conversely, the administrative law judge noted that the relevant A-M products were
essentially "stand alone" units designed for smaller retail establishments. Id. at 338.
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After the initial hearing in the TRW case, the administrative law judge
ruled that rigid application of the cross-elasticity of demand and reasonable
interchangeability of use tests to cases arising under section 8 of the Clayton
Act would be inappropriate because the cross-elasticity of demand and
reasonable interchangeability of use tests are designed to measure potential
competitive harm." The administrative law judge reasoned that since section
8 is a preventive statute designed to prevent interlocks before the interlocks
work any competitive harm, the cross-elasticity of demand and reasonable
interchangeability of use tests would be ill-suited to section 8 analysis because
the cross-elasticity of demand test and the reasonable interchangeability of
use test focus on competitive harm.58 The administrative law judge held that
in determining whether two corporations with interlocking directorates com-
pete, courts should examine whether the relationship between the two firms
is marked by "contest" or "rivalry." 9 Under the "contest" or "rivalry" stan-
dard, the administrative law judge found that TRW and A-M were
competitors. 60 The FTC complaint counsel and Shepard appealed the ad-
ministrative law judge's finding to the FTC.
61
On appeal, the FTC upheld the administrative law judge's conclusion that
the section 8 competition inquiry should not be limited to an examination
of cross-elasticity of demand and reasonable interchangeability of use. 62 The
FTC, however, found the administrative law judge's "rivalry" standard too
vague and conclusory to assist the court in determining whether two interlocked
corporations compete. 63 The FTC instead examined several general factors in
determining whether TRW and A-M competed.6 The Commission noted that
TRW's and A-M's products performed essentially the same tasks, 6 that TRW
and A-M had frequently approached the same clients, 66 and that TRW and
57. Id. at 355-56.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 355. In TRW, the administrative law judge held that TRW's and A-M's attempts
to win over the same potential customers sufficiently evidenced the required "contest" or "rivalry"
between the firms. Id. at 356. The administrative law judge then entered a cease and desist order
against Shepard. Id. at 371-72. The administrative law judge, however, did not issue orders against
A-M or TRW because A-M had entered into a consent order several months before the release
of the TRW decision and because TRW had not been involved actively in either Shepard's ap-
pointment to or Shepard's service on the A-M board. See id. at 368 (TRW played no active
role); 90 F.T.C. 144, 144 (1977) (A-M consent order).
60. 93 F.T.C. at 356.
61. Id. at 373.
62. Id. at 380.
63. Id. In TRW, the FTC noted that although the administrative law judge's "rivalry"
standard was not inaccurate, the standard was not workable. Id.
64. Id. at 381-83.
65. Id. In TR W, the FTC noted that, although the TRW credit authorization systems were
designed for large department stores and banks and the A-M systems were designed principally
for small retail establishments, both products performed the same kind of credit authorization
functions. Id. at 381.
66. Id.; see id. at 340-47 (initial TR W decision). In the initial TR W decision, the administrative
law judge studied the circumstances surrounding twelve major purchases of electronic funds transfer
machines. Id. at 340-47. Of the twelve buyers of electronic funds transfer systems, ten buyers
considered both the TRW and the A-M systems. Id. Of the remaining purchasers, one purchaser
looked at only the A-M system and one purchaser considered only the TRW machines. Id.
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A-M had offered to modify existing products to suit customers' needs.67 The
,FTC held this evidence sufficient to prove competition in a developing in-
dustry in which the traditional cross-elasticity of demand and reasonable in-
terchangeability of use standards may yield unsatisfactory results because of
a lack of product standardization.68 The FTC then issued cease and desist
orders against both TRW and Shepard." TRW and Shepard petitioned the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the FTC's decision.70
Upon review, the Ninth Circuit upheld the FTC's finding that TRW and
A-M were competitors.7' The TRW court noted that both the cross-elasticity
of demand test and the reasonable interchangeability of use test may be useful
in section 8 competition analysis. 72 For two reasons, however, the court held
that the FTC's failure to apply either test to determine whether TRW and
A-M were competitors was not error.73 First, the TRW court reiterated the
administrative law judge's argument that the cross-elasticity of demand and
reasonable interchangeability of use tests measure potential competitive harm
which is not a factor in section 8 competition analysis. Second, the court
stated that in developing industries the cross-elasticity of demand and reasonable
interchangeability of use tests are difficult to apply and are likely to lead to
inaccurate results because markets in developing industries are generally small,
product variation often is only beginning, and customers' needs usually are
not standardized.
7 5
Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that TRW products and A-M
products were sufficiently dissimilar that virtually no customer had a choice
of a satisfactory product from each firm, the court held that TRW and A-M
were competitors.7 ' The Ninth Circuit premised this finding of competition
67. Id. at 382; see id. at 340-47. The administrative law judge's study of twelve major
electronic funds transfer machine purchases indicated that on at least three occasions either TRW,
or A-M, or both TRW and A-M, had offered to modify existing products to suit customers'
needs. Id. at 340-47.
68. Id. at 382-83.
69. Id. at 389-91.
70. 647 F.2d at 944. Although the FTC rejected the administrative law judge's standard
for determining whether TRW and A-M competed, the FTC upheld the administrative law judge's
order against Shepard and issued a similar order against TRW. 93 F.T.C. at 386-89.
71. 647 F.2d at 948.
72. Id. at 947.
73. Id. The TR W court stated that the cross-elasticity of demand test and the interchangeabili-
ty of use test may yield realistic results in some markets. Id. The court, however, concluded
that the FTC did not err in rejecting the tests in TRW's case. Id.
74. Id.; see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (administrative law judge's discussion
of appropriateness of applying cross-elasticity of demand test and reasonable interchangeability
of use test to determine whether interlocked corporations compete).
75. 647 F.2d at 947 n.7. The TRW court's three objections to applying either the cross-
elasticity of demand test or the reasonable interchangeability of use test in developing industries
seem to focus on the nature of the market as a statistical sample. See id. For example, the court
noted that in developing industries markets are generally small, making for a small and inherently
less reliable statistical sample. Id.
76. Id. at 948. In holding that A-M and TRW were competitors, the TRW court cited
different factors than the FTC had mentioned. Id. at 946-47; see supra notes 64-67 and accom-
panying text (discussion of factors relevant to FTC's decision).
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upon several of the Brown Shoe Court's "practical indicia."" The court noted
specifically the extent to which the industry and the public recognized the two
corporations' products as competing or distinct, the similarity of the two cor-
porations' production techniques, and the extent to which the two corpora-
tions served different types of customers.' 8 The TRW court concluded that
Shepard's simultaneous service on the TRW and A-M boards violated section
8, but the court reversed the FTC's issuance of cease and desist orders because
the court noted that the violation was unlikely to recur."
TRW may have created only a limited developing industries exception to
a general rule that courts should measure competition under section 8 by either
the cross-elasticity of demand test or the reasonable interchangeability of use
test." The FTC, however, has expressed a preference for a broader interpreta-
tion of TRW, under which the Brown Shoe "practical indicia" inquiry would
become an alternative test of the competition between two interlocked cor-
porations whether or not the corporations operate in a developing industry. 8'
In Borg-Warner Corp. ,82 the FTC considered whether two manufacturers of
automobile replacement parts were competitors.8 3 The FTC staff had charged
Borg-Warner Corporation, Robert Bosch Corporation (Bosch), Hans Merkle,
and Hans Bacher with violating section 8 of the Clayton Act. 4 The FTC staff
argued that Merkle's and Bacher's simultaneous service on the Borg-Warner
and Bosch boards violated the Act because Borg-Warner and Bosch competed
in the manufacture and sale of "fast-moving" import automobile replacement
77. 647 F.2d at 947.
78. Id. The TRW court noted that potential buyers of point-of-sale credit authorization
systems or of electronic funds transfer systems generally approached both TRW and A-M before
ultimately purchasing any manufacturer's system. Id. at 948. The TRW court further found that
both TRW and A-M represented to potential buyers that the systems each corporation produced
could be modified to suit the customers' needs. Id. Finally, although the TRW and A-M systems
were best suited to different kinds of customers, the TR W court noted that TRW and A-M generally
marketed their systems to the same potential customers. Id.
79. Id. at 954.
80. See Note, Interlocking Directorates and the Clayton Act: A New Standard of Competi-
tion?, TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 19 Hous. L. REv. 809, 817 (1982) (suggestion that TRW may create
limited exception to cross-elasticity of demand and interchangeability of use rules for cases in
which cross-elasticity and interchangeability are difficult to measure).
81. See Borg-Warner Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,049, at 22,654 (F.T.C. June
23, 1983). In Borg-Warner, the FTC initially stated that the TRW court found A-M and TRW
to be competing because several of the seven Brown Shoe "indicia" had been met. Id. at 22,660.
The Borg-Warner commission then proceeded to analyze Borg-Warner under the Brown Shoe
"indicia." Id. at 22,660-63. The Borg-Warner commission, however, did not consider whether
the import automobile replacement parts industry was a developing industry. Id.; see infra notes
94-98 and accompanying text (TRW may create supply side alternative to cross-elasticity of de-
mand supply side alternative to cross-elasticity of demand and reasonable interchangeability of
use tests).
82. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,049, at 22,654 (F.T.C. June 23, 1983).
83. Id. at 22,659.
84. Id. at 22,665. In addition to charging Borg-Warner Corporation, Robert Bosch Cor-
poration, Dr. Merkle, and Dr. Bacher with violating § 8, the FTC implicated Robert Bosch GmbH,
the West German parent of Robert Bosch Corporation. Id.
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parts.8 5 Although the FTC held that the Borg-Warner and Bosch parts were
clearly interchangeable, the FTC noted that a plaintiff could also satisfy the
competition requirement of section 8 by showing that several of the Brown
Shoe "indicia" indicated that the interlocked corporations were competitors.
5 6
The FTC reasoned that courts considering the validity of interlocks should
not engage in any detailed analysis of cross-elasticity of demand or reasonable
interchangeability of use because section 8 is a preventive statute unconcerned
with the likelihood of actual competitive harm." The Borg-Warner commis-
sion found that Merkle's and Bacher's simultaneous service on the Borg-Warner
and Bosch boards violated section 8 and, accordingly, the FTC issued cease
and desist orders against Borg-Warner, Bosch, and Merkle. s8 The FTC in Borg-
Warner, therefore, effectively made the Brown Shoe "indicia" inquiry an alter-
native to the cross-elasticity of demand and reasonable interchangeability of
use tests because the automobile replacement parts industry considered in Borg-
Warner, unlike the industry considered in TRW, was an established industry.8 9
Prior to TRW and Borg-Warner, the FTC and the courts implicitly
acknowledged the cross-elasticity of demand and reasonable interchangeability
of use standards as determinative of competition under section 8.90 TRW and
Borg-Warner, however, suggest that the courts and the FTC are beginning
to expand the section 8 competition analysis. 91 The cross-elasticity of demand
test and the reasonable interchangeability of use test are similar because both
tests are demand oriented, analyzing competition from the consumers'
perspective. 92 Courts traditionally have concentrated on demand oriented
analysis in defining relevant markets. 93 In finding that TRW and A-M were
85. Id. Although Robert Bosch GmbH did not manufacture or sell auto parts in competi-
tion with Borg-Warner, the FTC charged that Robert Bosch GmbH exercised sufficient control
over Robert Bosch Corporation to render the interlocks between Borg-Warner and Bosch GmbH
illegal. Id.
86. Id.; see supra note 81 (discussion and application of TRW rule).
87. 3 TRADE RHO. REP. (CCH) 22,049, at 22,662 (F.T.C. June 23, 1983); see supra note
58 and accompanying text (section 8 is preventive statute).
88. 3 TRADE Rao. REP. (CCH) 22,049, at 22,655-56 (F.T.C. June 23, 1983).
89. See id. at 22,657 (Borg-Warner entered short-line import parts market in 1972 when
Bosch was already active).
90. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 82 F.T.C. 1819, 1820 (1973) (interlock between aluminum
company and copper company prohibited because copper and aluminum were interchangeable
for certain purposes); Aluminum Co. of Am., 82 F.T.C. 1814, 1815 (1973) (interlock between
aluminum company and steel company prohibited because steel and aluminum were interchangeable
for certain purposes); American Bakeries Co. v. Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 977, 981-82
(D. Md. 1981) (interlock between bakery companies permitted because companies' products not
interchangeable). Although neither Alcoa case reached litigation, the complaints in both cases
premised the FTC's allegation of competition upon the theory of reasonable interchangeability
of use. See 82 F.T.C. at 1820 (copper and aluminum are interchangeable); 82 F.T.C. at 1815
(steel and aluminum are interchangeable).
91. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (TRW and Borg-Warner may represent
trend toward supply side competition analysis under § 8).
92. See 16B J. VoN KAtiNowsKI, supra note 23, § 13.0312], at 13-38 (cross-elasticity of
demand test and reasonable interchangeability of use test pose essentially the same question).
93. See Sterling Drug, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 477, 585 (1972) (demand side analysis historically
has been favored in the courts over supply side analysis).
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competitors, however, the TRW court emphasized that TRW and A-M used
similar production techniques and that either firm could modify its products
to perform interchangeably with other firm's products. 4 The TRW court,
therefore, recognized that the list of firms competing in a given product market
may include firms that are not presently producing the product or a close
substitute, but that have the ability quickly and easily to begin producing the
product." The presence of peripheral competitors that could convert to the
production of the relevant product within a short period of time may be an
important factor in the competitive decisionmaking of present producers
because any unreasonable attempt by the present producers to raise prices or
limit output could cause the peripheral competitors to change over to the pro-
duction of the relevant product.9 6 Supply side analysis permits the courts to
give proper weight to the peripheral competitors' impact upon the market.97
Although demand oriented analysis continues to be a valuable market defini-
tion tool under both section 7 and section 8 of the Clayton Act, the TRW
decision and the Borg-Warner decision may be part of a growing overall trend
toward supply side competition analysis. 98
In recent years several of the United States Circuit Courts have
acknowledged the importance of supply side competition analysis in merger
cases brought under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 99 For example, in Equifax,
Inc. v. FTC,' the Ninth Circuit stated that production substitutability is a
valid basis upon which to measure the competition between two products.'0 '
In Equifax, the FTC charged that Equifax, Inc., a nationwide producer of
94. 647 F.2d at 946, 948.
95. See id. at 948 (although in almost every case customers' needs could be met only by
TRW system or only by A-M system, TRW and A-M were competitors).
96. See Note, The Role of Supply Substitutability in Defining the Relevant Product Market,
65 VA. L. REv. 129, 131-34 (1979) (firms with capacity quickly and easily to enter market act
as check on competitive abuses by firms in market). Although in theory every firm with the potential
to enter a market plays a role in tempering the anticompetitive behavior of actual producers
in the market, commentators and courts have recognized that only the most likely potential en-
trants are of real antitrust significance. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S.
602, 624-25 (1974) (merger.between present producer and perceived potential entrant would violate
§ 7 of Clayton Act only if potential entrant in fact tempered oligopolistic behavior of market
participants); Carter, Actual Potential Entry Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 66 VA. L.
RE. 1485, 1486-87 (1980) (discussion of Marine Bancorporation and the theory of potential
competition).
97. See L. SutrrwvA, supra note 20, at 58 (market definition analysis should include considera-
tion of both elasticity of supply and elasticity of demand); Note, The Role of Supply Substitutability
in Defining the Relevant Product Market, 65 VA. L. REv. 129, 132-34 (1979) (in defining markets,
courts should consider competitive impact of firms producing supply substitutes).
98. See infra notes 99-127 and accompanying text (discussion of trend toward supply side
analysis under Clayton Act § 7).
99. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324, 1330 (7th Cir. 1981)
(cross-elasticity of supply is one factor courts should consider in defining relevant market); Equifax,
Inc. v. FTC, 618 F.2d 63, 66 (9th Cir. 1980) (cross-elasticity of supply is valid basis for determin-
ing whether two products compete).
100. 618 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1980), vacating, Retail Credit Co., 92 F.T.C. 1 (1978).
101. Id. at 66; see infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (discussion of Ninth Circuit's
holding in Equifax).
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-character credit reports, violated section 7 of the Clayton Act by acquiring
three regional credit bureaus producing consumer credit reports. 02 The FTC
staff alleged that the acquisitions lessened competition in the local credit repor-
ting markets of Tacoma, Washington, Portland, Oregon, Washington, D.C.,
and San Francisco, California.' 3 Equifax contended that Equifax's reporting
services did not compete with the consumer credit reporting services of the
three regional credit bureaus Equifax had acquired.' 0 ' Equifax argued that
the production of character credit reports, such as mortgage reports, was
distinct from the production of consumer credit reports because character credit
reporting required extensive field research, while consumer credit reporting
involved only the compilation of bill-paying records already on file with the
reporting service."' The administrative law judge, however, rejected Equifax's
contention, holding instead that Equifax's acquisitions violated section 7 of
the Clayton Act because the acquisitions tended to restrain trade in the credit
reporting markets of Tacoma, Portland, and Washington, D.C.'
06
On appeal'0 7 the FTC conceded that mortgage reports are substantially
different from consumer credit reports both in substance and price.' 8 The
FTC, however, held that Equifax competed in the same credit reporting ser-
vice market as the three credit bureaus Equifax had acquired because of the
high production substitutability or cross-elasticity of supply between mortgage
reports and consumer credit reports.0 9 The FTC noted that the technologies
used to produce mortgage reports and consumer credit reports were similar,
that Equifax had produced consumer credit reports, and that the credit bureaus
Equifax had acquired had produced mortgage reports."0 The FTC concluded
that Equifax's acquisition of the three credit bureaus unlawfully lessened com-
102. 618 F.2d at 64. Equifax produced mortgage reports and other character credit reports
for clients desiring detailed information on the character and financial standing of prospective
borrowers. Id. at 66. Equifax acquired three credit bureaus producing routine reports on the
bill-paying habits of consumers applying for credit. Id.
103. 92 F.T.C. at 5-6. In Equifax, the FTC charged that Equifax's acquisitions of The Credit
Bureau, Inc. (C.B. West Coast) and The Retail Credit Association of Portland, Oregon, Inc.
(C.B. Portland) substantially lessened competition in the credit reporting market of Portland,
Oregon. Id. The FTC further charged that Equifax's acquisition of C.B. West Coast lessened
competition in the credit reporting markets of Tacoma, Washington and San Francisco, Califor-
nia. Id. Finally, the FTC alleged that Equifax's acquisition of The Credit Bureau, Inc. of
Washington, D.C. substantially lessened competition in the local credit reporting market of
Washington, D.C. Id.
104. 647 F.2d at 66-67.
105. Id.
106. 92 F.T.C. at 125-26. In Equifax, the administrative law judge found that Equifax was
neither a substantial actual competitor nor a likely or perceived likely potential entrant in the
local credit reporting market of San Francisco, California. Id. at 112-13. Accordingly, the ad-
ministrative law judge found that Equifax's acquisition of The Credit Bureau, Inc. of Salem
Oregon did not substantially lessen competition in the local credit reporting market of San Fran-
cisco. Id.
107. Id. at 131.
108. Id. at 136.




petition in the local credit reporting service markets of Portland, Tacoma,
San Francisco, and Washington, D.C."'
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court upheld the FTC's conclusion
that supply cross-elasticity may be a valid basis for determining that two pro-
ducts compete in the same product market."I The Equifax court noted that
most courts focus upon interchangeability of product use in defining product
markets. ",3 The court, however, further noted that as early as the Brown Shoe
decision in 1962, the Supreme Court had acknowledged the validity of supply
side competition analysis under section 7 of the Clayton Act.'' Although the
Ninth Circuit approved of the FTC's decision to apply the cross-elasticity of
supply standard, the court disagreed with the FTC's conclusion that the pro-
duction techniques used in preparing mortgage reports and consumer credit
reports were interchangeable.'" The court, therefore, concluded that the
Equifax acquisitions did not violate section 7 of the Clayton Act." 6
The courts have not been alone in emphasizing supply side considerations
in section 7 market analysis." In 1982, after the release of both Equifax and
TRW, the United States Department of Justice released the Department's newly
revised merger guidelines," 8 explaining the Justice Department's approach to
enforcing the merger provisions of section 7 of the Clayton Act.' 19 Under the
new guidelines the Justice Department judges the propriety of horizontal
mergers by a three step process.2 First, the Justice Department calculates
a provisional product market by grouping with the relevant product all
substitutes to which consumers would turn within six months if the producers
111. Id. at 142-45, 147, 150, 156. In Equifax, the FTC found that the San Francisco Bay
area credit reporting market was highly concentrated. Id at 143. The FTC noted that in concen-
trated markets even small increases in concentration may substantially lessen competition. Id.
Accordingly, the FTC held that Equifax's acquisition of The Credit Bureau, Inc. of Salem, Oregon
substantially lessened actual competition in the local credit reporting market of San Francisco,
notwithstanding that Equifax controlled less than three percent of the San Francisco credit report-
ing market. Id. at 143-44.
112. 618 F.2d at 66.
113. Id. (quoting Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264,
1271 (9th Cir. 1975)).
114. Id. The Equifax court referred to a footnote in Brown Shoe in which the Supreme
Court stated that the cross-elasticity of production facilities may be relevant in defining market
boundaries. Id.; see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 n.42 (1962). In Equifax,
however, the court held that evidence of a high cross-elasticity of supply between two products
may be sufficient to prove that the two products occupy a single market under § 7 of the Clayton
Act. 618 F.2d at 66.
115. 618 F.2d at 66-67.
116. Id. at 67.
117. See infra notes 122, 126-27 (revised Justice Department merger guidelines place increas-
ed emphasis on supply side factors).
118. Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4500,
at 6881 (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines].
119. See id. (Department of Justice Explanation and Summary); see generally Symposium:
The 1982 Merger Guidelines, 71 CAL. L. REv. 280 (1983).
120. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (discussion of three step analysis of horizon-
tal mergers).
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of the relevant product permanently raised the price of the relevant product
by five percent.' 2 ' Second, the Justice Department adds to the provisional
market the production capacity of all producers not presently producing the
relevant product, but likely to begin producing the relevant product or a close
substitute within six months if the producers of the relevant product
permanently raised the price of the relevant product by five percent.' Third,
the Justice Department applies a mathematical formula to the resulting market
to determine the probability that the questioned merger will have an an-
ticompetitive effect.
23
The Justice Department's new merger guidelines differ in many ways from
the previous guidelines. 12' The new guidelines place a heavier emphasis upon
economic analysis than did the previous guidelines. 2 ' For example, the Justice
Department now includes within the relevant market firms not presently pro-
ducing the relevant product, but capable of quickly and easily converting to
the production of the relevant product.' 26 The Justice Department, therefore,
like the Ninth Circuit, has recently begun to recognize fully the present and
actual competitive impact of firms with the short-run capability of entering
a relevant market.'
27
Ever since the Brown Shoe Court noted that similarity of production tech-
niques may be relevant in defining markets, supply side considerations have
121. See Guidelines, supra note 118, 4502.10, at 6881-8. Under the revised merger guidelines,
the Justice Department defines the relevant market by including with the relevant product all
substitutes at prevailing relevant product prices. Id. Next, the Department adds to the relevant
market all substitute products to which consumers might turn at any higher price level that the
producers of the relevant product could profitably charge. Id. The Department determines these
higher price level substitutes by hypothesizing a sequence of five percent price increases. id.
122. See Guidelines, supra note 118, 4502.20, at 6881-9. Under the revised merger guidelines,
the Justice Department identifies participants in the relevant market as firms producing the rele-
vant product or a substitute and firms that would begin producing the relevant product or a
substitute at any higher price that the producers of the relevant product could profitably charge.
Id. The Department also considers the competitive impact of used products that could be resold
and of products consumed internally by producers. Id.
123. See Guidelines, supra note 118, 4503, at 6881-11 to 6881-13. After defining the rele-
vant market and market participants under the revised merger guidelines, the Justice Department
analyzes the effects of a proposed merger on market concentration by applying the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of market concentration (HHI). Id at 6881-11. The HHI is a calculus weighting
the respective market shares of the merging firms. See Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 71 CAL. L. REV. 402 (1983) (discussion and analysis of HHI).
124. See Baker & Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 CAL. L. REv.
311 (1983) (discussion of differences between 1982 merger guidelines and 1968 merger guidelines);
see also Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice - 1968, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510,
at 6881-21 (1968) (1968 guidelines superseded by 1982 guidelines).
125. See Fox, The 1982 Merger Guidelines: When Economists are Kings? 71 CAL. L. REv.
281, 283 (1983) (1982 merger guidelines symbolize rise of economic analysis in antitrust law);
Baker & Blumenthal, supra note 124, at 317 (new merger guidelines are plainly economic).
126. See Guidelines, supra note 118, 4502.20, at 6881-9 (producers of supply substitutes
should be included among market participants); see also supra note 122 and accompanying text
(discussion of role of supply substitutability under new merger guidelines).




played a minor role in section 7 competition analysis.'28 The Ninth Circuit's
Equifax decision and the Justice Department's newly revised merger guidelines
evidence an increased emphasis upon supply side analysis as a means of defin-
ing markets under section 7 of the Clayton Act.' 9 TRW and, to a lesser ex-
tent, Borg-Warner appear to parallel this section 7 analytical trend in the con-
text of section 8, enlarging the definition of competitors to include not only
firms producing a demand substitute for the product in question, but also
firms producing short-run production substitutes. 130 Substantial authority sup-
ports the proposition that section 8 does not prohibit interlocks between poten-
tial competitors.' 3' The TR W court, however, correctly recognized that among
the broad class of potential competitors, some firms have such an immediate
capability of producing the relevant product that these firms are in fact actual
competitors influencing even the most minute of the day to day decisions of
the relevant product's producers.' 3 The TR W court and the Borg- Warner com-
mission effectively acknowledged that any standard of competition excluding
supply substitutability as a consideration may fail ultimately to "recognize
competition where, in fact, competition exists." ,33
JOHN T. MURRAY
128. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 n.42 (1962). The Brown Shoe
Court noted that cross-elasticity of production facilities may be significant in defining markets
in which to assess vertical mergers under § 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. Furthermore, the Brown
Shoe Court noted that uniqueness of production facilities may indicate that a firm operates in
a distinct product market. Id. at 325.
129. See supra notes 112-27 and accompanying text (discussion of supply side analysis in
Equifax and 1982 merger guidelines).
130. See TRW, Inc. v. F.T.C., 647 F.2d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 1981) (similarity of production
techniques may suggest competition in developing industry); Borg-Warner Corp., 3 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 22,049, at 22,660-62 (F.T.C. June 23, 1983) (similarity of production techniques
may suggest competition in established industry); see also supra notes 54-89 and accompanying
text (discussion of TRW and Borg-Warner).
131. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., 1966 TRADE CAS. (CCH)
71,678, at 82,065 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Clayton Act § 8 does not preclude interlocks between poten-
tial competitors); see also Com. ON rHE JuDiciARY, supra note 3, at 26 (Clayton Act § 8 does
not address interlocks between potential competitors because conglomerate corporations were
not significant market factor in 1914 when Clayton Act was passed); FEDERAL TRADE ComMas-
SION, supra note 6, at 10 (Clayton Act § 8 does not prohibit interlocks between potential com-
petitors). But see TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942, 946 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981) (declining to address
question whether § 8 prohibits interlocks between potential competitors).
132. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussion of competitive impact of fringe
competitors).
133. TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962)).
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